We develop, and experimentally test, models of informal agreements. Agents are assumed to be honest but su¤er costs of overcoming temptations. We extend two classical bargaining solutions -split-thedi¤erence and deal-me-out -to this informal agreement setting. For each solution there are two natural ways to do this, leaving us with 2 2 models to explore. In the experiment, a temptations-constrained version of deal-me-out emerges as the clear winner.
Introduction
Traditional bargaining theory, e.g. Nash (1950 Nash ( , 1953 , focuses on binding contracts. Much less attention has been given to informal (non-binding) agreements. A likely reason is that if people maximize own income, a common assumption, then there is limited scope for informal agreements to have impact. 1 A sel…sh agent would simply renege if this were in his interest.
Humans have tendencies that curb such opportunism. Successful entrepreneur Karl Eller, for example, wrote his book Integrity Is All You've Got (2005) in which that message is clear. One can justify honesty with reference to repetition or reputation, but that cannot be the whole story. Eller writes about "the happiness that comes with knowing you'll never be ashamed to face yourself in the mirror"(p. 103). Indeed, experiments indicate that honesty matters even in non-repeat settings with anonymity guaranteed. For example, Malhotra & Murnighan (2002) , Irlenbusch (2004) , Ben-Ner & Putterman (2009), and Kessler & Leider (2012) …nd that subjects who were o¤ered an opportunity to enter an informal agreement often did so and then delivered although they could have pro…tably reneged. 2 Honest individuals have much to gain by striking informal agreements. Binding contracts may be infeasible (e.g. in developing countries with unreliable courts), illegal (e.g. for cartelists), or costly (e.g. nuptials). This begs questions regarding the shape and impact of informal agreements when honest folks interact. We develop, and then experimentally test, relevant theory. Throughout, we assume that once individuals have struck an agreement they never renege. This is stark but once honesty is acknowledged to a degree, understanding the implications of complete honesty seems like a natural benchmark, so we start there.
For a variety of psychological reasons (discussed in section 2.2) honesty may (one way or another) be driven by psychic costs associated with breaking a promise or reneging. Such costs can only be incurred if the post-agreement behavior slips o¤-the-agreement-path. For honest individuals, this ensures adherence. Because the cost is counterfactual (never occurring) there is little reason to think its magnitude would a¤ect how lucrative an informal agreement seems to an honest party. It is thus natural to wonder whether honesty implies that informal agreements work just like binding contracts.
A key insight of our analysis is that this is not necessarily the case. A binding contract di¤ers from an informal agreement in that the latter involves materially pro…table post-agreement reneging opportunities. Much evidence suggests that people generally struggle with resisting temptations. 3 Although an honest person ful…lls the terms he agrees to, he need not be immune to the costs incurred when overcoming temptations to renege. These occur on-theagreement-path and a¤ect the evaluation of informal agreements, including which ones are worth striking. This e¤ect has no counterpart if a binding contract is considered, because binding contracts come with explicit sanctions that make reneging not seem tempting.
We work with the following framework: (i) an informal agreement may be reached by two players about to play what we will call an "underlying game;"(ii) the object of negotiation concerns which strategy pro…le to play; (iii) whether or not an informal agreement is in place, no material sanctions punish o¤-path play. We extend two classical bargaining solutions -splitthe-di¤erence and deal-me-out -to this setting. With temptation costs in the picture, there are two seemingly natural ways to do this; beyond a¤ect-ing participation constraints, temptation costs may or may not a¤ect the predicted deals themselves. This leaves us with 2 2 models to explore.
Anchoring our analysis on an underlying game allows us to be explicit about the nature of the economic situation in which a deal is struck, and it allows informal agreements to be truly non-binding since post-agreement that game must still be played. The underlying game does not describe the haggling process. Agreement-formation is instead captured implicitly, through a solution-concept and predictions are formulated in terms of restrictions on strategies that players agree on. Although we focus on informal agreements, as will be seen later the approach is not limited to such contexts; it allows for analyzing and comparing binding contracts as well.
Our contribution has two parts. #1 is formulating the theory. #2 is testing that theory in an experiment. Sections 2, 3, and 4 present theory, experiment, and concluding remarks including suggestions for follow-up research.
Theory

General framework
Our starting point is a two-player extensive game (form) with dollar payo¤s speci…ed at end nodes. Let S i be player i's set of strategies (taken to be singleton if i owns no information set), and S = S 1 S 2 . Let m i : S ! R be i's (dollar) payo¤-from-strategy-pro…le function, derived from .
This underlying game describes the strategic structure of a situation where two persons just met and face opportunities of collaboration for mutual gain. Assume that is a multi-stage game form with observed actions (including at endnodes), 4 so that all instances of imperfect information concern simultaneous choices. This simpli…es the key de…nitions below by allowing us to refer to subgames in a useful way, without essentially compromising scope since most applied and experimental work is concerned with such games. The payo¤s represent dollar increments relative to whatever wealth the players had before; a payo¤ of 0 means that a player's overall dollar wealth remains the same as if he had never met the other player. Many economic situations involve payments so it is natural to consider underlying games re ‡ecting that. For example, let H > 0 be the highest sum of the players'payo¤s at any endnode. The games we focus on have the property that if $ 1 ; $ 2 0 and $ 1 +$ 2 = H then admits some endnode with payo¤s ($ 1 ; $ 2 ), thus allowing ways to equalize gains. However, it is not incon-ceivable that an economic situation somehow signi…cantly constrains players' transfer opportunities away from allowing equal splits. Our de…nitions are intended to apply regardless and therefore stated without presumptions of transfer possibilities.
We envision the players as haggling over which strategy pro…le in to play.
itself does not describe this process which is rather captured via a solution concept with a special structure: We select a triple of strategy pro…les a; b; c 2 S such that a is the agreement, b is the behavior following the agreement, and c is what counterfactually would have happened if negotiations stranded. Predictions are formulated as restrictions on a; b; and c. Before we describe these, several clarifying comments are warranted:
First, since a; b; c 2 S are strategy pro…les they describe o¤-path play which we interpret as re ‡ecting the players'agreed upon understanding (presumably obtained through the haggling process or social norms) of what would happen following any deviation. 5 Second, we theorize only about what happens when negotiations generate agreements; c describes what would have happened had a not occurred, given that a does occur. It is possible that in some game no triple (a; b; c) exists that satis…es the postulated properties. The interpretation is that no agreement would be reached in that case. We o¤er no explicit prediction for play following such non-counterfactual negotiation-breakdown. Third, one could imagine a richer structure where c depends on how negotiations stranded (e.g., which player caused the break down). We abstract away from such nuances. Fourth, we elucidate why we do not explicitly model the strategic structure of pre-play negotiation. Consider Figure 1 , which comes with a story:
Player 1 is a hospital and player 2 an employed doctor. At the root 1 decides whether to Invest or N ot invest in costly training for 2 to learn a new radiography technique. In the former case 2 This description is meant to appear somewhat realistic, yet it is overly barren as it incorporates no opportunities for haggling, promises, threats, etc. A more meaningful account might incorporate how the players meet and discuss whether 1 should pay for the training and what 2's pension should be. How should one mgraphics/DocHosp.gi…ons? One possibility is to modify the game, to include counter-o¤ers, promises, threats, handshakes, signatures, etc., as explicit choices in agraphics/DocHosp.gifch a game is likely to be unwieldy. It may be intractable to apply a solution concept. It is against this backdrop that we formulate our approach.
This connects us to some classics. Von Neumann & Morgenstern (1944) approach all games other than two-player zero-sum ones with this outlook (see e.g. pp. 223-4). Nash (1953) assumes players strike binding contracts regarding how to play an underlying game, and before negotiations start they announce "threats"an "umpire"forces them to implement if they subsequently fail to reach an agreement. 7 We share the outlook that strategy pro…les are objects of negotiation, but neither limit attention to binding contracts nor presuppose access to an umpire. 8 
Speci…c Predictions
What psychological and economic principles determine the shape of a; b; c 2 S? The framework of section 2.1 is useful for formulating answers. We develop two speci…c models that, apart from assuming honesty and temptation costs, connect closely to classical bargaining scholarship. These models di¤er on the speci…cation of a but share a common speci…cation of b and c. We start with the latter two.
As regards c, counterfactual post-negotiation-breakdown play, we make Assumption 1: c is a subgame perfect equilibrium of using
This modeling choice is a compromise. On the one hand, many studies show that players often act pro-socially. In many games (e.g. prisoners' dilemma, public goods, or trust games) that exhibit a tension between individual and collective dollar-payo¤-maximization, subjects manage to reach e¢ cient outcomes, 9 suggesting that they appreciate collective well-being. On the other hand, it seems likely that players who do not manage to agree would end up being irritated with one another. Our assumption of sel…sh behavior takes a middle road. 10 Next consider b, behavior following an informal agreement. Our assumption, key to everything to follow, is that players honor their agreements: In principle it is of interest which story is more empirically relevant, but in this paper we do not aim to unpack the honesty box. We simply assume that agreements are honored.
Next we turn to a, the informal agreement itself. Unlike binding contracts, which are enforced by explicit material sanctions, adherence to an informal agreement needs support by psychological costs of reneging. To an honest person, such cognitive costs are su¢ ciently large to prevent reneging. Since they occur o¤-path (as reneging never happens) arguably they shouldn't affect how attractive a deal seems at the point of agreement. However, another subtle di¤erence between binding contracts and informal agreements occurs on-path, post-agreement. With an informal agreement a party may face materially lucrative opportunities to renege, which may be tempting. There is a sizable literature on human tendency to resist temptations. 11 It is often argued that humans can overcome temptation, but that this comes at a cost. If player i considers such costs when evaluating an informal agreement, then his subjective gain (i.e., net of the temptation cost) under an informal agreement will be lower than with the same strategy pro…le as a binding contract. These considerations may a¤ect the shape of the agreement. If the temptation costs are big enough, they may even make honest party accept a 2 S as a binding contract but not as an informal agreement. How should one calculate costs of overcoming temptation? Are they linear or perhaps convex in how much a player may gain (cf. The answers are not obvious. We work with the following formulation. Given an informal agreement a = (a i ; a j ) 2 S, i's cost of overcoming a temptation associated with a is a real-valued, continuous, strictly increasing, weakly convex function
Drawing on i , we now de…ne three concepts which are key components and which stay constant across all versions of our third assumption:
S is e¢ cient if there exists no a 00 2 S such 11 See the references in footnote 3. The literature focuses on single decision maker settings (Loewenstein & O'Donoghue's section VI is an exception), not temptation to renege and hurt a co-player, but that extension seems plausible to us. Indeed, Martinsson et al. reports support for "the proposition that individuals may experience a self-control con ‡ict between the temptation to act sel…shly and the better judgment to act pro-socially."
a 0 2 S is c-based if o¤-its-path a 0 speci…es the same choices as c.
To understand strict gains, note that m i (a) i (a) is the value of the deal net of temptation cost while m i (c) is the value of the forgone opportunity. The di¤erence
from-trade, which we shall require to be strict since it seems plausible that people agree only to deals where they improve. The e¢ ciency requirement is analogous to what is typically assumed in theories of binding contracts, and seems equally plausible in our context. The c-based requirement is an assumption about how the play proceeds after a player reneges. The motivation is analogous to what we proposed for c (including that c is independent of how negotiations stranded or the nature of reneging).
With this in place we state four competing versions of our third and …nal assumption. Each predicts that a particular equal split of something valuable will occur, if this is possible while respecting strict gains, e¢ ciency, and being c-based. The versions di¤er on exactly what is being split. We draw on classical bargaining scholarship and extend two models to our setting: splitthe-di¤erence and deal-me-out. Under the former the value split is measured relative to the parties "threat points" m i (c) for each i.
12 Under the latter the value is measured without regard to m i (c). 13 We consider versions where the value split re ‡ects, or does not re ‡ect, temptation costs. We will o¤er further comments, but doing so is easier if we can refer to the de…nitions. These are (with ESIP mnemonic for equal-split-if-possible):
Assumption 3 version (i): a 2 S allows strict gains, is e¢ cient, 12 When sel…sh, risk-neutral players divide money, a number of bargaining solutions make the same prediction as split-the-di¤erence, including the Nash (1950) and Kalai & Smorodinsky (1975) solutions. 13 Several experiments tested split-the-di¤erence vs. deal-me-out models in various bargaining scenarios (e.g. 
Assumption 3 version (ii): a 2 S allows strict gains, is e¢ cient, and is c-based. Moreover, it satis…es the following ESIP(ii) condition: Let E (ii) be a set of all a 0 2 S that allow strict gains, are e¢ cient, are c-based, and satisfy
Assumption 3 version (iii): a 2 S allows strict gains, is e¢ cient, and is c-based. Moreover, it satis…es the following ESIP(iii) condition: Let E (iii) be a set of all a 0 2 S that allow strict gains, are e¢ cient, are c-based, and satisfy
Assumption 3 version (iv): a 2 S allows strict gains, is e¢ cient, and is c-based. Moreover, it satis…es the following ESIP(iv) condition: Let E (iv) be a set of all a 0 2 S that allow strict gains, are e¢ cient, are c-based, and satisfy
These solutions depend on the i 's, as if those functions were known. In bargaining theory, assuming players to have common knowledge of features of one another's preferences (e.g. discount rates) is not unusual. How compelling is it to extend the idea to temptation costs? The assumption may be plausible for people who know each other very well. But perhaps more importantly, since our players are honest, it seems reasonable to assume that they do not pretend to have di¤erent i .
Our de…nitions re ‡ect two distinct ways to operationalize that idea. Assumption 3 versions (i) & (iii) involve default deals that factor in temptation costs directly. During the course of negotiations players'o¤ers and actions reveal their i 's to one another! This is stark. Sticking to an agreement may be one thing, revealing private information quite another.
14 Nevertheless, the assumption is consistent with (extreme) honesty, a testable benchmark worth considering. Assumption 3 versions (ii) & (iv), by contrast, involve default deals that refer to material rewards only (again, with or without m i (c) in the picture). Temptation costs now matter only through the strict gains and e¢ ciency conditions. Players merely say "yes" or "no" to the default deals as given by ESIP(ii) or ESIP(iv). For many underlying games, if the default scenario with equal-gains/shares obtains, the prediction is unique. However, if equal-gains/shares is incompatible with strict gains, e¢ ciency, and being c-based, then any deal that satis…es the latter three restrictions may obtain. 15 Existence is not guaranteed, as it may be impossible to satisfy those requirements. If the temptations that weigh on the players become very strong, both may demand "compensation" (relative to equal-gains/shares) beyond what's feasible. We illustrate these possibilities in section 3.
Binding Contracts
Our main interest concerns informal agreements but our framework admits the case of binding contracts as a special case. To cover that, assume that, independent of whether a party is honest, deals are honored because high explicit sanctions would punish breach of contract. Players are then not tempted to renege. Hence, binding contracts may be studied by applying Assumptions 1, 2, and 3( ), assuming that i (s) = 0 for all s 2 S, i 2 N . This interpretation presumes there are no issues of moral hazard, such that some choices would be non-veri…able to a contracting party (or a court) and a binding contract regulating that choice infeasible. This is justi…ed through our assumption of observed actions (also at endnodes; cf. section 2.1). A large contract-theoretic literature explores moral hazard -see e.g. Bolton & Dewatripont (2005) for an entry. We restrict attention to underlying games where the issue is irrelevant, in order to highlight di¤erences between informal agreements and binding contracts other than feasibility.
An Experiment
We proposed four extensions of classical bargaining theory to informal agreements. Are they empirically relevant? We designed an experiment to shed light on the issue.
Experimental Games and Predictions
We use the lost wallet game (Dufwenberg & Gneezy 2000) , presented in Figure 2 , where d 2 f0; 5g is a parameter which varies by treatment. The game presents several advantages: It is easy to explain to subjects and implement, yet rich enough to allow a deal with equal payo¤s. The theory generates sharp comparative statics predictions across our four treatments (discussed shortly). As regards c 2 S, there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium using (m i ) i=1;2 , namely (s 1 ; s 2 ) = (s 1 ; x) = (Out; 30). Our solutions predict that only player B may face a temptation to renege, which simpli…es the analysis (relative to, say, the hospital-doctor game of section 2.1).
The assumptions of section 2.2 imply that c = (Out; 30) and b = a, but rule out a = (Out; x) for any x. Too see this, note that the pro…le is not c-based unless x = 30, in which case strict gains fails for A. 
Since B is strictly increasing and continuous each of the two equations has a unique solution. However, in each case, the solution is not guaranteed to always satisfy the strict-gains constraint. If it is satis…ed, then the corresponding set E (j) , j 2 fi; iig, is nonempty and we have found our solution: agreement a = (In; x (j) ).
16
Otherwise, E (j) is empty. Then, using the strict-gains constraint, we get a solution set:
for all x < 20 + d then this set is also empty, illustrating the potential for non-existence. 17 Otherwise, all the elements are c-based and e¢ cient, so all the corresponding a = (In; x) satisfy our assumptions. Now move to assumptions 3(iii) and 3(iv). ESIP(iii) implies that if pos-
Claims that follow are parallel to those in the preceding paragraph. If any of the solutions satis…es the strict-gains constraint, then the corresponding set E (j) , j 2 fii; ivg, is nonempty and we have found our so- The following tables summarize the predictions for the cases when the agreement exists. An agreement always involves A choosing In. B keeps an amount x that corresponds to the appropriate case as shown. Informal agreement (IA):
Informal agreement (IA):
The experiment uses a 2 2 between-subjects design that closely follows the discussion above. 18 Between treatments we varied payo¤ parameter d 2 f0; 5g and whether the agreement was informal (IA) or a binding contract (BC). The four treatments are labeled: BC-0, BC-5, IA-0, and IA-5.
For binding contracts we obtain point predictions. Each pair of subjects agrees that A chooses In and B keeps the amount as speci…ed in the top panel of Table ( 1). For informal agreements the predictions are summarized in the middle and the lower panels of Table (1) . Again, every agreement involves A choosing In. However, the distribution of x's will depend on the (unobservable) distribution of B 's in the subject population. To keep the discussion organized we separately discuss two cases: one, where B is rather ‡at so that predictions are contained within the middle panel of Table ( Table (1) . From the table it is clear that as we move from IA-5 to IA-0 the boundaries shift to the right (by 5). Hence, the strict-gains constraint is more likely to bind in IA-5 than IA-0. This has identi…able implications for the theory under assumptions 3(iii) and 3(iv). Notice that in these two cases the theory makes point predictions unless (some) subjects have high enough B 's. For these instances we expect the agreed on x's to compensate (favor) players B.
Finally, if the subject's B is so steep that the if-equal-split-not-possible set is empty, then there is simply no room for players to agree. This would happen when B (30 x) < 20 for all x < 20 + d. Since the condition is tighter in the d = 0 case, if there are any disagreements we would expect them to be more likely in IA-0 than in IA-5.
Procedures
The experiment was computerized and conducted at the University of Arizona's Economic Science Laboratory. The software was written in Visual Basic 6. In total, 204 undergraduate students participated as subjects. The sessions and participation is summarized in Table 8 in Appendix A. Subjects played one game -no repetitions -and were then privately paid. The average …nal payment was $19.90, including a $5 show-up fee. On average, sessions lasted about 50 minutes. 19 Once all subjects were seated at computer terminals separated by privacy dividers, hard copies of instructions were handed out (see Appendix B) and subjects were given 10-15 minutes to read them. When everyone had …nished reading, the instructions were also read out loud. After this, the experimenters answered any questions individually. The software then started up with a set of comprehension questions. Every subject had to get all answers correct before the experiment proceeded further.
Our theory presumes pre-play negotiation but leaves the strategic details of this process implicit, re ‡ected only through the solution concept. In the lab, however, one has to o¤er some speci…c format for the haggling. We chose an alternating-o¤er structure. After being acquainted with game details, and learning their respective roles as player A or B, subjects could send proposals back and forth and agree on how to play. One person from each pair was randomly selected to make an opening proposal. Each proposal speci…ed whether player A would choose In or Out, and, conditional on In, the amount that player B would keep. The party who received a proposal could accept it, make a counter-proposal, or disagree and quit negotiating. Acceptance of a proposal led to an agreement. This ended the negotiations and a message saying either "Player A chooses OUT" or, e.g., "Player A chooses IN and Player B keeps $18 and gives $12 to Player A" appeared on the pair's computer screens. A counter-proposal reversed the negotiation roles while a disagreement terminated the negotiation process. There was no limit imposed on the length of negotiations or on the time within which a subject had to submit his decision.
Main Results
In what follows y is the agreed-upon x, z is the post-agreement choice of x. Table 2 presents raw data on negotiated agreements and paths of play. 20 In the IA-treatments, the agreement/path of play is described by the amount for player B (= y; z), implying that A chooses In, or by indicating that the choice for A is Out (and hence that B had no decision to make). In the BC-treatments, z = y by de…nition/design. Table 2 shows that apart from two cases in BC-5 all other pairs of subjects 20 Appendix A contains more complete descriptive statistics. Note: y refers to the agreed-upon amount that player B would keep and z to the amount B actually kept. Highlighted in bold are all observations that di¤er from 15. reached an agreement. All BC's involved player A choosing In. In the IAtreatments 100% of our subject-pairs formed an agreement. From the vantage point of the theory, this would suggest that the subjects' B 's are not high enough to induce disagreements. All but one agreement involved player A choosing In. 21 These patterns can, largely, be accommodated by all models. Table 3, distilled from Table 2 , provides a summary of reached agreements and subsequent behavior. The …rst column, Obs, denotes the number of subject pairs who participated in a given treatment. The second column, Agr, provides the count of reached agreements which we further split (in subsequent columns) into what these agreements prescribe that players A and B do. For A's we compare the number of subjects who agreed on In (see column "Agreed to In") with those who agreed and chose In (column "Chose In"). For example, in IA-0, twenty-four A's agreed to choose In and twenty-three of them subsequently honored that agreement. In IA-5 all twenty-six A's agreed and chose In. 22 Finally, in the rightmost part of the table we list the number of B's for whom the amount kept (z) was smaller than, equal, or greater than the agreed upon amount (y).
Agreement formation
Do players honor agreements?
23 Table 3 shows that a majority of agreements were honored. In all cases 21 One pair in IA-5 agreed on Out, then A chose In and B kept 15. 22 Observation 27 involves the subjects who agreed on Out, then chose In and 15. 23 In the BC-treatments, presented in the two bottom rows, by de…nition there is no variation between the agreement and the observed behavior of either player.
where A agreed to choose In, that choice was subsequently made. B's, unlike A's, cost themselves a lot of money (usually $15) by not reneging. Nevertheless, the proportion of B's who honor the agreement is rather high. In IA-0 74% of B's did exactly what they agreed to. In IA-5 this proportion was slightly lower at 64%. Out of the sixteen subjects who reneged (about 10% of B's), …ve kept everything (31% of those who reneged) while the remaining eleven gave their paired player A's a non-zero amount. 24 While our assumption of honesty does not garner universal support it approximates the data reasonably well. 25 Equal splits & compensated deals: do temptation costs matter?
As regards agreements formation and honesty, the aspects of the data discussed so far match up with the theory rather well. In this section we proceed to test the implications of the various versions of Assumption 3 on the distribution of y's across treatments, performing several associated tests. Table 4 presents the data in the condensed form. In all treatments we …nd substantial concentrations of observations on equal splits (y = 15). It is useful to categorize the data with respect to equal-splits vs. other agreements. We break up the data into three separate blocks: …rst we only present BC 24 We discuss these 'sel…sh'and 'semi-honest'subjects further in section 3.4. 25 In seminars we were sometimes asked whether the negotiation had a noticeable e¤ect behavior. We know from existing studies that pre-play communication typically has a dramatic impact, see e. ; 5g as we do here, though the total pie on the side of the player B was 20 rather than 30. With this caveat in mind we can use their data to make more concrete comparisons: Our B players choose more equal splits than S&V's (78% vs. 35% for the IA-0-treatments); 50% vs. 31% for the IA-5-treatments). Our B's give zero (z = 0) less often than S&V's (9% vs. 38% for IA-0; 12% vs. 31% for IA-5). Our B's give more than S&V's (the average amounts given, measured as percentages of the available pie, are 44% vs. 31% for IA-0; 39% vs. 26% for IA-5). In the BC treatments (see the top panel of Table 4 ), high frequencies of equal-splits support versions (ii) and (iv) of the Assumption 3. 26 In particular, data from BC-0 convincingly reject versions (i) and (iii) that predict all y's at 10. In fact, there is only a single y = 10 in the data. However, one may be wondering whether the four cases in BC-5 where y > 15 exert signi…cant pull on the distribution. We cannot reject the equality of the two y-distributions in BC treatments (two-sided Fisher's exact test has p-value = 0:58).
When it comes to IA treatments (the middle panel of Table 4 ) we again observe distinct patterns in the data. Two observations are the key to testing 26 Recall, this is supporting the classical notion of deal-me-out.
various versions of the Assumption 3.
Observation 1:
In both IA treatments, we notice large frequencies of equal splits, y = 15. In IA-0 the share is 86% and in IA-5 it is 69%.
Observation 2: deviations from the equal split (either y < 15 or y > 15) are signi…cantly di¤erent between the two treatments. There are three such cases in IA-0 (12.5% of the sample agreed on y < 15) and eight opposite cases in IA-5 (30.7% of the sample agreed on y > 15). We can reject the equality of the two y-distributions in the IA treatments at 1% level (two-sided Fisher's exact test has p-value = 0:001).
Those observations have the following implications for versions (i)-(iv) of the Assumption 3:
Assumption 3(i) is inconsistent with Observation 1. Generating such high frequencies of equal splits in both treatments would require a large group of subjects in IA-0 with a B for which 5 = B (15) and another large group of subjects in IA-5 with a di¤erent B for which 0 = B (15) . This is inconsistent with participants having comparable underlying characteristics across treatments. Moreover, in IA-5 this violates monotonicity of B .
Assumption 3(ii) is inconsistent with both Observations 1 and 2. The last argument of the previous case applies here as well. To explain the high shares of equal splits in both treatments we would need to have large proportions of subjects in both treatments with B 's for which 0 = B (15); this would violate the monotonicity assumption on B . But perhaps this argument is too strict. It could be that B is indeed quite ‡at and instead of agreeing on predicted y = 16 or 17 subjects naturally gravitate toward 15, despite the positive temptation costs.
But if B 's are rather ‡at, then the distributions of y's in the two IA treatments should be the same. This is rejected by Observation 2.
Assumption 3(iii) is inconsistent with Observation 1. In IA-0, A3(iii) predicts that all data be concentrated y = 10 unless B 's are steep enough so that y = 10 < B (30 y), i.e., E (iii) is empty. In that case the agreement could be any y 2 f B (30 y); :::; 20g. The theory does not specify any particular y from this set so it is safe to assume that as long as 15 is included, it would be picked as the "focal"agreement. The fact that there is just one agreement at y = 10 indicates that for most subjects B 's are steep enough so that B (30 y) > 10. This, however, implies that B (30 y)+5 > 15, and so in IA-5 most agreements should be compensated: y > 15. Although, there are a signi…cant number of compensated agreements, the frequency of equal splits is too high to be in line with this prediction.
Assumption 3(iv) is (largely) consistent with both Observations 1 and 2 and organizes the data quite well. It predicts an equal split in both IA treatments if B 's are moderately steep. Otherwise, for steep B 's, agreements are predicted to compensate players B, i.e., y > 15. This is more likely to happen in the IA-5 than in IA-0, hence, if there are any compensated agreements we would expect that they are more frequent in IA-5 than in IA-0. This is indeed the observed pattern. Taking a further step and restricting attention to those subjects in the position of player B who did what they agreed on -i.e., who were the revealed honest -in the bottom part of Table (4), we …nd the same qualitative pattern and a signi…cant di¤erence between the two frequency distributions of y's (two-sided Fisher's exact test 28 has p-value = 0:018).
29 28 Applying Fisher's test to sample restriction is not without caveats as marginals are no longer exogenous by design. Subjects selected into the restricted sample, making Fisher's test more conservative. In our case, we can reject at a high signi…cance level even despite this potential issue. 29 There are three deviations from equal split in IA-0 that go in the "wrong direction"
Square deals
The data in the BC treatments are consistent with versions (ii) and (iv) of Assumption 3, and the data in IA treatments with version (iv). Consequently, we …nd that the overall evidence supports version (iv). It deserves a nice name, indicating how the notions of honesty and equity shape an informal agreement. We baptize any deal satisfying the combination of Assumptions 1, 2, and 3(iv) a square deal. According to dictionaries, "square" can mean "straightforward and honest"as well as (in math) that "all sides are equal." Since we predict, and …nd, that many players are honest and that many deals involve straightforward equal splits, the terminology seems appropriate.
We hope future research will test square-deal predictions in other games. In this connection, we have a comment to add: So far we emphasized how the solution (often) involves a particular equal split. Another interpretation is feasible though. Perhaps a square deal is best thought of not as a theory of splitting gains but rather as a theory based on focal points? Splitting monetary gains, rather than overall gains (that include temptation costs), would be focal. This idea connects to a line of thought that goes back to Thomas Schelling. In two intriguing recent papers, Isoni, Poulsen, Sugden & Tsutsui (2011, 2014) discuss Schelling's (1960) idea that outcomes under tacit bargaining (where communication is incomplete or impossible) as well as binding contracts may depend on focal points which in turn may depend on cues such as object proximity, existing location of bargaining parties, salience of geographical boundaries (e.g. a river), precedence of supply chains, or a historical consumer base. Isoni et al. experimentally test Schelling's theory and …nd some support. We suggest that these ideas naturally extend beyond tacit bargaining and bargaining with binding contracts, to explicit haggling and informal agreements, which is our main focus. It would seem an ex-(y < 15 instead of predicted y > 15). Notice however that all those agreements were broken; B reneged, violating our (extreme) assumption of honesty.
citing long-run goal to merge the ideas of Schelling + Isoni et al. with our framework, although in this paper we focus on a simpler norm which may nevertheless be very relevant in many contexts (that perhaps lack salient locations, rivers, or historical antecedents): 50/50 splits. 30 
Additional Observations
We close this section by brie ‡y discussing three systematic and intriguing patterns in the data that are either at odds with or not explicitly predicted by any of the models discussed so far.
Reneging and semi-honesty
Our …rst comment belongs to subjects who reneged but did not keep all 30. Such behavior lies outside the tight boundaries of our theoretical model. It is not easy to judge whether these subjects acted in an honest or a dishonest manner. On one hand, they did break the agreement; on the other hand, they still showed concern for their respective player A's by sending them some money. Perhaps one might refer to them as semi-honest.
What should we think of their behavior? In IA-0 three pairs negotiated agreements in which players B were supposed to keep y = 0; 10; and 13. However, each of the B players reneged by "shading"the agreed-on amount by some fraction and keeping z = 15; 20; and 18, respectively. It seems as if these semi-honest B's had di¤erent terms in mind -ones where 30 > y > 15. The remaining data are in line with this story. In IA-5 we observe eight agreements compensating B's but this time only three of them reneged (y = 16; 17; 24 and z = 20; 15; 22 respectively). Each of the three subjects gave his matched player A a positive amount. In two of those cases B actually gave A more money than what they agreed on!
The sel…sh fringe
Next let us examine the behavior of player B subjects who have kept all 30 for themselves. Only …ve subjects fall into this category. It might nevertheless be interesting to look at their negotiation patterns. If their behavior was planned, then they knew at the point of the agreement that they were going to renege. One would think that their main objective would then be to maximize the chances that their paired player A chooses In. What is the most likely behavior to do the job?
All …ve B's in question ended up agreeing on an equal split. Three of them accepted the opening equal split proposals made by their respective A's. One of them proposed an equal split which was accepted. And the last one initially proposed 25 for himself but that was rejected and countered with an equal split. This proposal was accepted by B.
Beware of people who do not goof around! The sel…sh fringe hide among the subjects who strike 50/50 deals. We …nd it intriguing that there seem to be conformity in the community of con…dence tricksters. An analogous …nd-ing, for a di¤erent strategic setting with asymmetric information, is reported by Charness & Dufwenberg (2011; see Section III.C)
Bargaining delay
Our next remark concerns a systematic pattern of bargaining delay. Most of the time the parties agree quickly, but in almost all instances where the negotiating proceeds several rounds this happens in the BC-treatments and involves a player who demands more than 15. In Table 5 we list the sequences of proposal exchange for all deals that gave player B more money in treatments BC-5 and IA-5. BC-5 agreements that favored player B (y > 15) involved a struggle between the paired subjects, with one pair negotiating as long as …fteen rounds! By contrast, similar agreements in IA-5 were settled easily with only a few rounds of o¤er-exchange. We …nd a similar pattern for other departures from equal split in BC-0 and IA-0 (see Table 6 which presents data on the length of negotiations broken down by …nal agreement y). Agreements that depart from equal splits in the BC-treatments were hard bargains while this is not the case in the IA-treatments. Why do we observe this bargaining delay with informal agreements but not with binding agreements? Our intuition is as follows: Agreements that are predicted by the theory incorporate a certain fairness standard, which makes them legitimate proposals. In BC-treatments an equal-split is the only legitimate agreement and hence the only legitimate proposal to make. Insisting on y 6 = 15 should lead to con ‡ict and bargaining delay. In IAtreatments, these o¤ers could be justi…ed based on subjects'di¤erent B 's. Therefore, the terms favoring one of the subjects might be more easily agreed upon. There are multiple ways of evaluating this conjecture. One is in terms of the length of negotiations. Table 6 provides clear support for the argument suggested above. The average length of negotiations (number of rounds of o¤er-exchange) for proposals that cannot be easily justi…ed (in the pooled data from BC-treatments when y 6 = 15) is distinctly longer, 4.5-7 rounds, than for all other proposals (in the pooled data from the remaining treatments), 1.048-1.818. 31 Another way of looking at the same issue is by comparing acceptance rates for the initial proposals.
32 Table 7 gives the summary of the data.
The acceptance rate for initial proposals that are di¢ cult to justify (y 6 = 15 in BC-treatments) is signi…cantly lower (0-10%) than for the rest of the opening proposals ( 50%). 33 Equal split proposals clearly attract the higher acceptance rate ( 86%). This suggests that departures from equal splits in the BC-treatments are typically viewed as unjusti…ed, and so become hard bargains. The resulting deals are then likely driven by an imbalance in subjects'patience and obstinacy.
Discussion
Informal agreements have been given scant attention in economic theory. Are they unimportant? Couldn't agents rather rely on binding contracts? We do not think so for several reasons. First, binding contracts may be infeasible. Consider two impatient …sher-men in a developing country where neither courts nor policemen are reliable. It may be impossible to legally enforce a contract which regulates access to a nearby lake. Does this doom the …shermen to excessive depletion of the …sh stock? Even if the interaction is repeated, classical theory would say yes (because of the impatience). According to our theory, the answer may be no, if the …shermen rely on an informal agreement.
Second, binding contracts may be illegal. Think of collusion in a one-shot government procurement auction in industrial countries. Courts exist, police can be relied on, yet bid rigging is illegal. Does that imply that the outcome will be as competitive as standard auction theory suggests? Perhaps not. Suppose …rm representatives meet in a bar, have a pint, shake hands, and agree to collude. If they act as in our theory, their deal may stick.
Third, even if binding contracts are feasible in principle (as they perhaps usually are) they may be costly. A man meets a woman and they play the (one-shot, sequential) game of life with decisions on having kids, who works, divorce, alimony, etc. A binding contract may involve signi…cant costs ranging from lawyers' fees to unforeseen contingencies to awkward feelings regarding legal chit-chat during courtship. Perhaps, instead, the couple shun the formalities, look one another in the eye, promise to be faithful forever?
Building on classical notions from the literature on binding contracts, we developed and tested four models of informal agreement formation for honest agents. All models fared well in that agreements formed and the degree of subsequent honesty was rather large. Only one theory, which we (in section 3.3) named the square deal solution, captured the following two key data features: the preponderance of agreements involve 50/50 splits of the total monetary gains and a fraction of struck deals deviate from 50/50 in a particular direction to favor the party who is most tempted to renege.
The de…nitions proposed apply rather generally. However, we conclude by noting some important issues we have not addressed. First, our framework may be adequate for exploring "endogenously incomplete contracts" where parties elect to regulate only some choices through binding contracts. Second, we restricted attention to settings where we could disregard moral hazard. The advantage was that we could highlight how for honest bargaining parties a key di¤erence between informal agreements and binding contracts concerns the relative presence of temptation costs, and the way these may shape deals. However, settings with moral hazard are tremendously important and should be studied too; temptation costs will then bear, to some degree, also with binding contracts. Third, our theories assume that agreements would be universally honored. In our data honesty was commonplace, but not universal. Addressing heterogeneity in honesty may be doable and worthwhile. Fourth, we limited attention to games with two players, but many situations involve multiple bargaining parties. Fifth, in many contexts material costs and revenues are not as readily observable as our above account (with given m i functions) may suggest. For example, how should considerations of unobserved cost-of-e¤ort or consumer surplus be dealt with? Sixth, even when dollar payo¤s are given, 50/50 splits may not be focal in all settings and a re…ned theory may consider alternatives (recall our remarks in section 3.3, related to the important work of Isoni et al.) .
We hope our paper will stimulate more work -theory & experimentson the selection, shape, and impact of informal agreements. 
Appendix
Additional information
Instructions
In what follows we present the universal version of the instructions in which {... or ...} always contains two di¤erent versions of the text that was used appropriately in di¤erent treatments.
Now that the experiment has begun, we ask that you do not talk with each other for the duration of the experiment. If you have a question after we …nish reading the instructions, please raise your hand and the experimenter will approach you and answer your question in private.
You will receive $5 for participating in this experiment. You may also receive additional money, depending on the choices made (as described below). Your earnings will be paid to you in cash individually and privately.
During the session, you will be paired with another person. However, no participant will ever know the identity of the person he or she is paired with.
In the experiment, one person from each pair will be randomly selected to be Player A and the other to be Player B. The players will interact in two stages: 1. The Negotiation Stage and 2. The Game. In the negotiation stage the players can form an agreement about how to play the game. Any agreement reached in the negotiation stage {will or will not} be enforced and the players {will have to play according to the agreement or be free to make any decisions} in the game that follows. The decisions {in the game or in the negotiation stage} will determine how much each of the players earns in the experiment.
We next describe …rst the game and then the negotiation stage that precedes it. 
The Game
The Negotiation Stage
Before the game is played the players can form an agreement about how to play the game. One player from each pair will be randomly selected to make the …rst proposal and the other player will be asked to respond to it. A proposal describes the choices of Player A and Player B in the game.
It could be:
Player A chooses OUT or it could be Player A chooses IN and Player B keeps $x and gives $30 -x to Player A.
The proposal is sent to the other player by clicking on the "Submit" button. The responding player observes the proposal and chooses one of the following three options:
Agree with the proposal by clicking on the button "Agree."In this case an agreement is formed and {will or will not} be enforced.
Make a counter-proposal by clicking on the button "Make a counterproposal."This reverses the roles of the players in the negotiation. Now, the player who clicked this button makes a new proposal and sends it to the other player. The other player will then have the chance to respond by either agreeing with the proposal, or making a counter-proposal, or disagreeing.
Disagree and quit negotiating by clicking on the button "Disagree and quit negotiating."In this case no agreement is reached and negotiations terminate. Both players proceed to play the game.
Control Questions: (computerized, not part of paper instructions)
The following question relates to the Disagreement Stage.
1. Please answer. If no agreement has been reached in the Negotiations Stage:
(i) The Disagreement Stage choices of both players will be implemented.
(ii) Both players proceed to play the game.
(iii) It is the end of the experiment and both players collect their show up fees.
The following question relates to the Negotiations Stage.
2. Select the correct answer. If one player makes a proposal and the other player agrees with it: a) An agreement is made and it will determine both persons' …nal payo¤s b) An agreement is made but it will not determine the …nal payo¤s; the pair still has to play a game.
The following three questions relate to the Game.
3. Select the correct answer. Player A chose IN:
